The Russians Were Coming: The Soviet Military Threat = in the 1967 Six-Day War

From: Subject: The Russians Were Coming: The Soviet Military Threat in the 1967 Six-Day War Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2007 17:18:22 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="text/html"; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0000_01C7F497.C12895D0" X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.3138 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0000_01C7F497.C12895D0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue4/jv4n4a5.html The Russians Were Coming: The Soviet Military Threat = in the 1967 Six-Day War

=20

Volume 4, No. 4 - December=20 2000

The Russians Were Coming: The Soviet Military Threat = in the=20 1967 Six-Day War

By I= sabella=20 Ginor

Editor's Summary: New evidence reveals that = during the=20 1967 Six-Day War the Soviet Union set in motion military operations to = assist=20 Egypt and especially Syria, first in seeking to overcome Israel and then = in=20 response to Israel=92s pre-emptive attack. These potential steps = included a naval=20 landing, airborne reinforcement and air support for ground operations. = Action=20 was aborted at the last minute due, among other factors, to a firm US = response=20 and dissension among Soviet leaders in Moscow.

8:48 = a.m. on June=20 10, 1967 was =93a time of great concern and utmost gravity=94 in the = White House=20 Situation Room, according to U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Llewellyn = Thompson, one=20 of the presidential advisors present there. (1) A message had just been = received=20 over the Moscow-Washington hotline from Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin=20 threatening a Soviet military action that might lead to nuclear=20 confrontation.(2) Newly = received=20 evidence now shows the threat was not an empty one: the Soviets had = prepared a=20 naval landing, with air support, on Israel's shores. =

New evidence summarized in this article indicates that the Soviet=20 intervention was not only planned but actually set in motion before = being=20 aborted. Soviet officials interviewed insist that such operations were = meant=20 only to deter Israel from overwhelming Egypt and, especially, Syria, as = well as=20 to stop the United States from intervening on Israel=92s side. In order = to achieve=20 this outcome, however, the projected action had to be made known to = these=20 adversaries, and this was carefully avoided by the Soviets. Yet details = of the=20 operation were kept in total secrecy, have been denied to this day, and = remained=20 generally unknown to Israeli and American intelligence.

Thus, = unless the=20 Soviets grossly overestimated the other side=92s intelligence = capability, this=20 indicates that the operation was to be implemented, not just threatened. = Moreover, preparations for this operation began well before the Soviets = even=20 accused Israel of offensive designs, the supposed reason for the=20 intervention.

Well = before 1967,=20 Israel had been targeted by the KGB's Foreign Intelligence (First) = Directorate=20 as a theater of operations during a larger East-West conflict. = Preparations had=20 been made there for parachuting at least diversionnye razvedyvatelnye = gruppy=20 (DRGs--sabotage-intelligence groups) to destroy Israeli targets. = During=20 1964-66, according to documents supplied by the defecting KGB archivist = Vasili=20 Mitrokhin, Israel was one of the countries where caches of arms and = radio=20 equipment were prepositioned for such operations. Mitrokhin claims some = of these=20 were boobytrapped and may be in place to this day.(3) The direct = involvement of=20 Soviet personnel on Israeli soil, at least on a small scale, had thus = already=20 been considered and approved.

The Soviet Union = played a=20 central role in escalating Middle East tensions to the brink of war in = 1967, and=20 evidence is accumulating that it actually instigated the conflict. In = his=20 recently published memoirs, Nikita S. Khrushchev asserts that the USSR's = military command first encouraged high-ranking Egyptian and Syrian = delegations,=20 in a series of =93hush-hush=94 mutual visits, to go to war, then = persuaded the=20 Soviet political leadership to support these steps, in the full = knowledge they=20 were aimed at starting a war to destroy Israel.(4)

The conventional = Western=20 chronology of this crisis starts on May 13, 1967 when Egypt made the = false=20 charge, based on information provided by the USSR, that Israel was = massing=20 forces on its border with Syria in preparation for an attack. But even = as the=20 crisis unfolded, on May 26, a U.S. diplomat remarked to a Soviet = interlocutor:=20 =93It almost seemed as though the Soviet Union had been aware in advance = of the=20 coming Near Eastern crisis, since [Communist Party Secretary Leonid I.] = Brezhnev=20 had first called for withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet [from the = Mediterranean] on=20 April 24.=94(5)

The Soviet = Ambassador in=20 Tel Aviv, Dmitri S. Chuvakhin, declined an Israeli invitation to see for = himself=20 that the charges of troop concentrations were baseless. Twenty-four = years later,=20 Chuvakhin maintained in an interview that =93[Israeli Prime Minister = Levi] Eshkol=20 did pose the question, but unfortunately it isn't a diplomat's = assignment to=20 tour frontiers and see whether forces are being massed there or = not.=94(6) Israeli=20 Foreign Minister Abba Eban correctly identified the Soviet source of the = Egyptians' =93bad intelligence=94 and complained to U.S. Ambassador = Walworth Barbour=20 that =93talking with the Soviet Ambassador here [is] like talking to = someone from=20 a different planet.=94(7)

General Muhammad = Fawzi, the=20 Egyptian Chief of Staff, did go to Syria to see for himself and reported = that=20 =93there was no sign of Israeli troop concentrations and the Russians = must have=20 been having hallucinations.=94(8) But the KGB is reported, by a = defector, to have=20 planted agents among Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's closest = advisors=20 (9), and he apparently chose to believe them--or simply stuck to a plan = agreed=20 upon previously with the Soviets.

The Soviet press, = including=20 Pravda's Cairo correspondent Yevgeny Primakov (later Russia's SVR = [Foreign Intelligence] chief, foreign minister and premier) contributed=20 inflammatory allegations about Israel's aggressive intent.(10) For the = first=20 time, Moscow sent much of its Black Sea and Northern Fleets into the=20 Mediterranean (11) and discreetly backed Nasser when he demanded the = removal of=20 the UN force from Sinai and blocked Israeli shipping through the Gulf of = Aqaba=20 to the port of Eilat. The U.S. embassy in Cairo was certain that Egypt = had =93full=20 Soviet backing=94 on the latter move and was concerned that the State = Department=20 thought otherwise.(12)

In Moscow several = days=20 later, Thompson asked a =93well-informed=94 Soviet source =93point blank = whether=20 Soviets knew in advance of Egyptian action in closing Gulf of Aqaba. He = was=20 obviously embarrassed...and after a long pause said he thought Nasser = had acted=20 on his own.=94(13) At the UN, where Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Fedorenko = was=20 stalling proposals to lift the blockade, his Canadian and Danish = colleagues told=20 him they had =93a nasty feeling [the] USSR [was] playing [a] game of = allowing=20 crisis to build to force Israel to act.=94(14)

Ex-KGB General = Oleg=20 Kalugin, then the agency's deputy =93resident=94 [station chief] for = political=20 intelligence in Washington, recalls that =93no one in Moscow had any = doubt=94 that=20 Israel would be quickly defeated.(15) When the war did erupt, the Soviet = ambassador in Jordan said to his American counterpart =93in a perfectly=20 matter-of-fact way =91you know, our estimate is that if the Israelis do = not=20 receive large-scale outside assistance... we think the Arabs will win = the war,=20 if [it] is allowed to be fought to the finish=92.=94(16) =

On May 18, with = the=20 situation rapidly escalating, Eban handed Barbour a letter to President = Lyndon=20 B. Johnson stating, =93There may be an impression in Cairo and Damascus = that=20 Soviet support...is assured, and that therefore they have no need of = restraint.=94=20 He asked for =93an emphatic clarification by the United States to the = Soviet Union=20 of the American commitment to Israel=85.I can hardly exaggerate the = importance and=20 urgency of such an approach.=94(17) The same day, Undersecretary of = State Eugene=20 Rostow expressed to Soviet Charge d'Affaires Chernyakov = =93concern...over=20 Israeli-Syrian tensions and told him of Syrian Government rumors...that = Syria=20 had been promised unlimited military and political support by USSR,=94 = of which=20 Chernyakov said he was unaware.(18)

The next day the = U.S.=20 defense attach=E9 in Israel attended a briefing by Israeli Military = Intelligence=20 chief Aharon Yariv and reported that Yariv shared the belief of the = Egyptian and=20 Syrian governments that their =93present actions [have the] backing of = USSR.=94=20 Yariv, however, was =93not sure how deep USSR is committed.=94(19) = Nonetheless, on=20 May 19 the State Department informed the main U.S. embassies "that if = conflict=20 occurred in the Middle East, the USSR would be in difficult spot. = Russian=20 temptation would be to aid Egypt and Syria, but [the] USSR was reluctant = to=20 promote hostilities in Arab world as means to exert pressure on US over = Vietnam.=20 The USSR realized [a] Middle Eastern War would be hard to control. They = would=20 make at least unilateral efforts to stop it.=94(20) =

In Washington on = May 20,=20 Israel Ambassador Avraham Harman called =93urgently=94 on Undersecretary = Rostow to=20 report full details of Eban's =93disturbing=94 conversation with = Chuvakhin: =93[The]=20 latter asserted [that] terror incidents on Syrian border [were the] work = of=20 [the] CIA, adding, =91We have warned you. You are responsible.'=94 = Harman raised,=20 =93[The] possibility we may be getting double talk from [the] = Soviets...[and the]=20 possibility of Soviet-Syrian-Egyptian collusion.=94 (21) =

On May 24, Deputy = Undersecretary of State Raymond L. Garthoff had one of his frequent = appointments=20 with Boris N. Sedov, =93KGB officer and second secretary of the Soviet = Embassy=94 as=20 Garthoff later described him.(22) =93Sedov left the general impression = that if the=20 United States were to become directly involved militarily in the = escalating=20 Middle East conflict, the Soviet Union, too, would have to become = involved. But=20 he was vague and noncommittal as to the way it would become involved.=94 = This=20 reminded Garthoff of Sedov's mentioning to him, a month earlier, = Brezhnev's=20 demand for withdrawal of the U.S. Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean, = and this=20 time he included it in his report of the conversation.(23) Sedov would = soon=20 become much more specific.

In Moscow on May 26, newly appointed = KGB Chairman=20 Yuri V. Andropov briefed the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist = Party on=20 the Middle East situation, referring to a report prepared by his agency. = The day=20 before, he stated, =93at a meeting of Israel's propaganda services' = chiefs,=20 Propaganda Minister [Israel] Galili declared that the government of = Israel had=20 decided to commence military operations against [Egypt] in two or three = days.=20 This data...is confirmed by reports received from Israeli military = circles. The=20 Eshkol cabinet has completed its war preparations.=94 The KGB report = assessed that=20 American military intervention was likely, especially to open the Gulf = of Aqaba,=20 and stated that =93aircraft of the Sixth Fleet are, since May 23, = routinely=20 carrying out reconnaissance flights over the northern coast of [Egypt] = and in=20 the region of Gaza.=94 (24)

The next day--Saturday--Chernyakov = requested an=20 urgent meeting with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and presented a letter = from=20 Kosygin. The note warned, in line with the KGB report, that =93Israel is = actively=20 engaged in military preparations and evidently intends to carry out = armed=20 aggression...Israeli militant circles are attempting to impose...an=20 'adventurist' action...[and] may cause an armed conflict.=94 Kosygin warned that =93if arms = should be=20 used this could be the beginning of far-reaching events. Should Israel = commit=20 aggression and military operations begin, then we will render assistance = to=20 those countries that are subject to aggression.=94 Rusk took this = seriously enough=20 to urgently inform allied leaders and urged Johnson--then at his Texas = ranch--to=20 relay Kosygin's message to Eshkol immediately, with a warning against = preemptive=20 action =93which would make it impossible for friends...to stand by = you.=94 Johnson=20 did so but toned down the warning. (25)

Ambassador = Thompson, before=20 coming to Washington, had cabled from Moscow on May 28 about a warning = from the=20 Egyptian Embassy's political counselor that =93Nasser has [a] larger = commitment=20 from [the] Soviets than anyone (presumably including the source) had=20 realized.=85[The] Soviet objective is to transform Arab-Israeli struggle = into=20 showdown between Communists and anti-Communists for control of Middle = East, and=20 Soviets are succeeding. If Nasser wins this one, monarchies and Western = oil=20 interests will go.=94 Thompson however =93emphasized=94 that his = =93source was=20 distraught, that he claimed to be =91not in the know=92 and that his = views [were]=20 probably colored by his clear dislike of both Nasser and Soviets.=94 = (26) The=20 United States, in sum, had formed no assessment of Soviet offensive=20 intentions.

On June 5, Israel = launched=20 a pre-emptive strike against its Arab neighbors (which, over six days, = cost the=20 lives of 35 Soviet advisors stationed at Egyptian and Syrian military=20 installations).(27) Kosygin immediately activated the Moscow-Washington = teletype=20 hotline for the first time since it was installed following the Cuban = missile=20 crisis of 1962. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara recounted = recently that=20 when the line rang at 7:15 am, he awoke Johnson. =93The president comes = on the=20 line and says, =91What in the hell are you calling for at this = hour?=92=94 McNamara=20 told him. Within fifteen minutes they, along with Rusk, had begun what = became a=20 nearly continuous conference in the White House Situation Room. = (28)=20

A total of 20 = messages were=20 exchanged. =93The president watched with great care=94 this material, = according to=20 Johnson's advisor McGeorge Bundy. At the outset, the Americans were = =93mainly=20 concerned with the awful shape we would be in if the Israelis were = losing. We=20 didn't know anything about the situation on the ground.=85It was in a = way=20 reassuring when it became clear that the fighting was the Israelis' idea = and the=20 idea was working.=94 (29)

For the first = five days of=20 the war, the messages dealt mainly with securing a cease-fire on the=20 Israeli-Egyptian front and exchanging information on the USS Liberty = incident,=20 which will be discussed later. Although the Soviet side made no explicit = threat=20 to use force over the hotline, hints were dropped elsewhere. Soviet = Ambassador=20 Chuvakhin told his German counterpart in Tel Aviv, Rolf Pauls, =93In = [an]=20 unusually serious vein,=94 as Pauls related to his American counterpart, = =93If now=20 Israelis become quite drunk with success and pursue their aggression = further the=20 future of this little country will be a very sad one.=94(30)=20

Then, on June 10, = the=20 Soviet premier weighed in with a stern warning over the hotline: Israeli = forces,=20 after routing Egypt and Jordan, were according to Kosygin =93conducting = an=20 offensive toward Damascus,=94 the Syrian capital.(31) =93The feeling of = those in the=20 Situation Room,=94 as Thompson recorded for the National Security = Council history=20 file, =93was that the Israelis were probably doing so.=94(32) The = Americans no=20 longer had a manned embassy in Damascus and=96incredibly=96no = independent assessment=20 of the Israeli offensive on the Golan Heights. This was true despite a = dispatch=20 from Ambassador Barbour two days earlier, stating that in conversations = with=20 other diplomats =93We have already taken steps to calm what I believe is = exaggerated impression of Israeli military ambitions. We have [the] = impression=20 [that] 25 kilometers will be [Israel's] maximum penetration [of] = Syria.=94(33)=20 This assessment had apparently not been relayed to the Situation Room, = where CIA=20 Director Richard Helms was called in for his evaluation. The best he = could do=20 was to try and reach =93friendly powers=94 that still had diplomatic = missions in=20 Syria. (34)

According to a = top-secret=20 memoir contributed by Helms to the NSC history dossier, conversation in = the=20 Situation Room =93was in the lowest voices he had ever heard.=85The = atmosphere was=20 tense.=94 (35) Kosygin's message went on: =93A very crucial moment has = now arrived=20 which forces us, if military actions are not stopped in the next few = hours, to=20 adopt an independent decision. We are ready to do this. However, these = actions=20 may bring us into a clash which will lead to a grave catastrophe=85.We = propose=20 that you demand from Israel that it unconditionally cease military = action.=85We=20 purpose to warn Israel that if this is not fulfilled, necessary actions = will be=20 taken, including military.=94(36) This hasty translation was read to = President=20 Johnson and his seven aides present. Thompson was asked to double-check = that the=20 original Russian text indeed threatened military action by the USSR. It = did. =93In=20 effect,=94 says McNamara, =93it said:`Mr. President, if you want war, = you'll get=20 war.' That's how tense the situation was.=94(37)

Anatoly F. Dobrynin, then Soviet = Ambassador in=20 Washington, now claims not to have been privy to Kosygin's message of = June 10.=20 In a recent interview he insisted that the USSR never meant to intervene = militarily and never even threatened it. Confronted with Kosygin's = words, he=20 persisted:

=93I don't see any direct military intervention here. That's = your=20 interpretation and it doesn't arise directly from Kosygin's = text=85.That's=20 diplomatic language which is used to permit certain variations and = leave room=20 for future negotiation.=85He might have wanted to leave some = uncertainty, that's=20 what you call diplomacy.=94 =20
Q. It = says=20 =93including military.=94

A. = =93Necessary=20 measures=94 might be various. It doesn't go into detail. Don't read = into it what=20 it doesn't say. What's more, the course of events showed there was no = military=20 action on our part. (38)

Still, all the = American=20 aides present on June 10 in the Situation Room recalled--in Bundy's=20 words--=93considerable discussion about what in fact the Soviets would = be able to=20 do to the Israelis if they did try to carry out their threat.=94 Bundy = thought=20 that =93the Russians' possibilities were really not that = impressive.=94(39)=20 McNamara, on the other hand, states now: =93We did not have any specific = intelligence on [a Soviet plan to intervene]. But we were fearful that = Syria=20 might call on the Soviets for support to attack Israel, and Israel's = very=20 existence would be at stake.=94 (40) New evidence now reveals that the = Soviets=20 were indeed poised to attack Israel, just as McNamara had suspected, and = had=20 been preparing for such a mission all along.

As early as May = 11, Soviet=20 Arabic-language interpreters stationed in Egypt were summoned to the = Soviet=20 Embassy in Cairo. One of them later recounted to journalist Aleksandr = Khaldeev=20 that they were told war between Egypt and Israel was inevitable. Later = they were=20 taken to Alexandria and informed they would be posted to the ships of = the Black=20 Sea Fleet, now cruising off the Israeli shore. =93One of the = interpreters...said=20 he knew for sure that we would be attached to a 'desant' (MEANING = =3Ddescent,=20 landing) force that would be landing in Haifa [Israel's main commercial = harbor=20 and naval base] or slightly northward.=94 The interpreters were to = handle liaison=20 with Israel=92s Arab population, =93who were longing for us.=94 = (41)=20

This backs up an = eyewitness=20 account received recently from a participant in the putative landing. = Yuri N.=20 Khripunkov was in June 1967 a young gunnery lieutenant on board a new = BPK (large=20 anti-submarine ship), then the fastest, most advanced model in the = Soviet Navy.=20 It was part of a large reinforcement force for the Mediterranean = flotilla which=20 arrived from the Black Sea base of Sevastopol in early May (42), shortly = after=20 Brezhnev demanded the withdrawal of the Sixth Fleet. At least one more=20 detachment--including four destroyers, two =93hydrographic vessels=94 (a = cover name=20 for intelligence ships) and even one =93icebreaker=94--went through the = Turkish=20 straits on May 31.(43)

The Israelis = appear to have=20 been more concerned about the threat posed by the Soviet fleet than the=20 Americans were. The Israeli military's spokesman told the U.S. defense = attache=20 on May 25: =93We are very anxious to know what [the] Soviet fleet in = [the] East=20 Mediterranean is doing. We knew they were in the area of Crete and think = they=20 may have moved north.=94 This was however only 17th among the points he = made. (44)=20 A member of the Israeli general staff at the time recalls hearing that a = Soviet=20 landing =93had been discussed at cabinet sessions, but only as a = theoretic[al]=20 possibility.=94 (45)

The Israeli concern was well-based in = fact.=20 Khripunkov relates how on June 5 his captain ordered him to raise and = command a=20 30-man detachment of =93volunteers=94 for a landing on the Israeli = coast. Similar=20 parties were being assembled on all the 30-odd Soviet surface vessels in = the=20 Mediterranean, for a total of some 1000 men. The assignment for = Khripunkov's=20 platoon was to penetrate Haifa port.(46)

The Russian = military=20 historian Col. Valery A. Yaremenko confirms that such a directive was = issued.=20 =93In order to influence Israel, the order was given to raise quickly, = on board=20 the ships of the squadron in the Mediterranean, units of untrained = marines=96that=20 is, regular seamen. They were supposed to sail toward Alexandria and = make a=20 trial `desant' in that port. But the order was rescinded almost = immediately as=20 unrealistic.=94 Yaremenko is unaware of written orders mentioning an = Israeli=20 target for the landing. But he adds that there was a standing order from = the=20 commander of the Soviet Navy that =93If the Israelis try to blockade the = Egyptian=20 or Syrian coast, or to hamper the activity of Soviet vessels bringing = arms and=20 materiel to these countries, steps should be taken and arms used if = necessary.=94=20 In a comment unconfirmed as yet by any other source, Yaremenko adds that = =93There=20 were minor incidents between Soviet ships and Israel patrol craft, which = fortunately ended peacefully.=94 (47)

Khripunkov was = told that in=20 addition to the improvised landing parties =93there was also one BDK = [large=20 amphibious ship] with about 40 tanks and maybe a battalion of = infantry.=94(48) On=20 June 8, briefing an emissary from the White House, General Yariv said = =93[We] knew=20 that [a Soviet] ship had left Russian port in last few days which was = loaded=20 with 70 tanks and anti-aircraft material,=94 but he attributed this to = Soviet=20 resupplying of Egypt. (49)

Dobrynin = maintains that=20 =93there was no=85intention on the part of the Soviet government [to = intervene].=20 There were rumors, but there could be any kind of rumors. But there was = no real=20 intention on the part of the government. This I know for sure.=94 Still, = he=20 admits, =93[Generals] have their own considerations...They plan all = kinds of=20 variations that may or may not be realized.=94 (50) =

According to one account, = Acting Defense=20 Minister [later full Minister] Andrei A. Grechko and Andropov were = =93pressing for=20 the immediate dispatch of Soviet forces to the Middle East. They were = supported=20 by [Nikolai G.] Yegorichev, party boss for the city of Moscow, who = suggested a=20 landing on the isthmus of Sinai [perhaps the land spit between the = Bardawil=20 lagoon and the Mediterranean] to start a march on Tel Aviv;=94 = Yegorichev now=20 denies making any such recommendations. (51) He had just (April 1967) = visited=20 Egypt and, according to other sources, reported that both that country = and Syria=20 needed much greater Soviet military support to confront Israel = successfully.=20 (52)

On board = Khripunkov's BPK,=20 only one sailor refused to =93volunteer.=94 He was later transferred but = not=20 otherwise punished. The hazards of the operation were obvious. The = seamen were=20 neither trained nor equipped for a commando raid on land. Khripunkov = later=20 recalled: =93What were we supposed to accomplish, with my pistol and the = sailors=92=20 AK-47s? Get in there and see, they told us. `Throw your RG-42's [depth = grenades=20 designed for use against frogmen]. Wipe out the enemy forces.'=94 Wait = for=20 reinforcements, they were told in general terms =93but nothing concrete = was said.=20 The air force was going to support us.=94 Not that Khripunkov and his = men expected=20 much from the promised air support. =93Who was going to look for the = landing=20 force? How could we contact them? We had nothing ready=96no radio gear, = no codes,=20 no signal rockets, nothing.=94(53)

A retired Soviet = air force=20 lieutenant general, Yuri V. Nastenko, confirmed recently that bomber and = fighter/reconnaissance units, the latter comprising MiG-21s under his = command,=20 were put on full operational alert on the evening of June 5, and he was=20 convinced this was in preparation for =93real combat.=94 The armed = aircraft were=20 flown the next day to an airbase =93on the border=94=96presumably with = Turkey--and the=20 crews were scrambled several times over the following three days. =93The = command=20 was working on the assumption that we would land at Syrian bases, and = thus would=20 have to overfly a neutral country such as Turkey. The Soviet government = was=20 deliberating what to do if this passage was denied, since breaking = through=20 anyway might mean war! Common sense finally prevailed, the units were = returned=20 to base and the all-clear was given.=94 (54) Professor Ze'ev Katz of the = Hebrew=20 University interviewed two immigrants to Israel in the early 1990s, = former=20 Soviet paratroopers who reported that their units also spent several = days in=20 transport aircraft on the runways, prepared for a drop in the Middle=20 East.(55)

On June 10, while = Kosygin's=20 message was being analyzed in the White House, Garthoff was again invited to = lunch by=20 Sedov. This time Garthoff immediately sent an urgent, secret memo to=20 Undersecretary of State and former Ambassador in Moscow Foy D. Kohler, = relating=20 that Sedov brought up the situation in Syria and =93expressed very great = concern=20 over Israeli intentions to take Damascus.=85He sought to elicit the = American=20 reaction if the Soviet Union sent troops to Syria. I said that would be = =91a new=20 war=92....We were allies of Greece, Turkey and Iran, and it would be a = hostile act=20 to send Soviet troops through their air space if, as I would suppose, = they did=20 not give permission.=85Sedov smiled and said they probably wouldn't = bother to=20 ask.=85I emphasized it would be extremely unfortunate and dangerous if = the Soviet=20 Union should intervene in Syria.=94(56)

Dobrynin = responded angrily=20 when confronted by the present writer with this report, belittling Sedov = as just=20 one of many embassy staffers. =93I know he [Sedov] wasn't authorized to = ask this=20 question. If he did so in a conversation, it was only that--a talk = between two=20 diplomats trying to get something out of each other. It's difficult for = me to=20 comment on something I didn't authorize him to speak about.=94(57)=20

But Sedov's = inquiry was far=20 from hypothetical. On June 8, the U.S. ambassador in Turkey reported = that he had=20 been contacted, late the previous night, by senior Foreign Office = official Ilter=20 Turkmen (later foreign minister). Turkmen informed him that on June 6, = the=20 =93Iraqi government through [the] Turk[ish] Ambassador in Baghdad had = requested=20 [the government of Turkey] to grant overflight rights to MiG-21s which = Iraq was=20 receiving from USSR. [The] Iraqis cited US-UK intervention in Middle = East as=20 reason for obtaining aircraft but were vague about numbers involved or = timetable=20 for delivery. Turkmen said [Turkey] had not been approached by USSR = re[garding]=20 MiGs. Turks were replying...[that] they would be unable to grant request = because=20 of [the UN] Security Council cease-fire resolution and questions = regarding=20 Turkish security. Turkmen requested this information be held very = closely.=94(58)=20 The Turks clearly considered the proposed aircraft passage to be = connected with=20 the Arab-Israeli war and thus coming under the Security Council = resolution.=20 Sedov had technically been truthful in saying the Soviets had not asked = directly=20 for permission to make overflights.

McNamara says the = Soviet=20 preparations for an invasion were unknown to him at the time, but = =93[Israel's]=20 intelligence services, ours, [and] the British all had information that = Nasser=20 was going to attack Israel and literally destroy the country=85.There = was a great=20 risk that if Egypt attacked [Israel and that if Israel] defeated Egypt, = that the=20 Soviets would [intervene] in support of Egypt. We wanted=85to be in a = position to=20 apply our military force in [Israel's] support to prevent [its] being=20 annihilated by a combination of Egypt, Syria and the Soviet Union. And = we feared=20 that if [Israel] pre-empted=85and=85then needed U.S. military support, = our people=20 would say =91Dammit, why the hell should we support them, they started = the war.=92=20 So we tried to persuade [Israel] and we thought we had persuaded = [it] not=20 to pre-empt.=94 But after Israel did attack and succeeded, =93Johnson = and I were=20 wondering.=85What will Syria do? And what will the Soviet Union do, with = Egypt=96their client=96being severely weakened?=94(59) =

Khripunkov says = he and his=20 men were well aware they were pawns in this global power play. Losing = 1000 men,=20 he remarked, was "nothing for the USSR. They started counting at five = million.=20 Each side wanted to demonstrate its dominant role=85.The United States = sends in=20 the [Sixth] Fleet. We bring in our Black Sea Squadron. They send in spy = planes.=20 We start preparing a landing in Israel. The Israeli tanks move through = Sinai and=20 are ready to skip over the Suez Canal. What then? We land our force and = World=20 War III begins?=85The whole world would be destroyed=94(60). This was, = ultimately,=20 the =93grave catastrophe=94 threatened by Kosygin.

McNamara refuses to this day to discuss = the=20 still-controversial USS Liberty incident, and dismisses the ironic = possibility=20 that Israel=92s attack on the intelligence ship prevented an early = warning of the=20 Soviet action. The Liberty, a U.S. navy intelligence-gathering ship, had = taken=20 Russian and Arabic-speaking experts on board and according to survivors = among=20 its crew was deployed to monitor Soviet activities.(61) Israel's initial = explanation for its attack on the Liberty was the appearance on = Israeli=20 radar screens of =93a large number of blips approaching...from the west = that might=20 have indicated an all-out Egyptian naval attack.=85Later it was = established that=20 the blips...had been echoes from unusual cloud formations.=94(62) Or was = this the=20 Soviet flotilla?

There is, on the other hand, a = suggestion that=20 Israel=92s attack on the Liberty had a direct bearing on Soviet = operational=20 decisions. According to an official Russian military publication, the = Soviets=20 considered--like the Liberty survivors--that Israel attacked the ship=20 deliberately in order to obstruct its monitoring Israeli preparations to = use=20 =93nuclear and chemical weapons, whose existence had never been denied = officially=20 by Tel Aviv.=94 In response, this as yet uncorroborated account asserts = that a=20 Soviet naval squadron armed with nuclear weapons was sent into Egyptian = waters=20 in the Red Sea.(63)

Meanwhile, in the = Mediterranean, =93for five or six nights we awaited the order [to = land],=94 says=20 Khripunkov. =93We were moving constantly, sailing from the region north = of=20 Alexandria and the Suez Canal toward Cyprus and Crete, keeping 50 to 100 = miles=20 from the Israeli coast.=94(64) The zero hour for landing was repeatedly = postponed.=20 Even Khrushchev, who felt in retrospect that the Soviets had been wrong = to=20 support Nasser's designs on Israel, also considered it had been a = mistake to=20 leave him in the lurch. (65)

Moscow's failure = to=20 intervene caused the Soviets considerable trouble with their other = proteges. In=20 October 1967, the CIA reported, =93Since the Middle East crisis the = Castro regime=20 has been very critical of the USSR for not supporting its = friends...having=20 backed down from its commitments to aid its allies whenever Soviet = action might=20 result in a direct confrontation with the United States. The Cuban = leaders=20 [fear] the USSR will not come to the aid of Cuba in case of an = attack.=94=20 Immediately after the 1967 war, Kosygin hastened to Havana to placate = these=20 anxieties and, according to a CIA cable, =93Informed Castro that the = USSR had been=20 prepared to aid [Egypt] in the struggle against Israel but...Field = Marshal Amir=20 [Abdel-Hakim Amer], Chief of [Egypt's] armed forces, told the USSR that = [Egypt]=20 intended to stop fighting within several days.=94(66) From Cairo, = however, the CIA=20 reported soon after the war that Amer and a powerful faction in the = Cairo=20 leadership had rather been intent on preventing total Soviet domination = of=20 Egypt. (67)

Soviet = embarrassment over=20 the failure to rescue Egypt was still sore enough in November 1970 for=20 Khrushchev to exploit it in order to end an investigation against him by = the=20 Central Committee's Control Board after he was deposed as the Soviet = leader.=20 After hours of harsh questioning, the transcript shows how Khrushchev = changed=20 the subject abruptly:

Khrushchev: As a man and member of the party, how could we--with = all our=20 power--permit Egypt to suffer such a rout?.=85I'm frequently asked = about the=20 Israeli aggression, and I answer that I don't know everything since = I'm=20 retired.

Chairman: That=20 ends the conversation. (68)

The Soviets = finally made=20 their explicit threat over the hotline only when Syria, too, appeared to = be on=20 the verge of defeat by Israel. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan--the member = of the=20 Israeli leadership most acutely, if intuitively, preoccupied with the = question=20 of Soviet military intervention--had delayed responding to Syrian = shelling of=20 Israeli towns from the Golan mainly out of fear that the Soviets would = act, and=20 Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin noted in his memoirs that Dayan's warning = to the=20 cabinet =93managed to sow a sense of grave disquiet among the = ministers.=94 Dayan=20 related years later that he changed his mind and ordered the assault on = Syria=20 only after seeing Israel complete its victory over Egypt without the = Soviets=20 intervening. Like Moscow=92s allies, he saw the USSR=92s failure to save = Nasser as a=20 sign of weakness. (69) One can only speculate whether Dayan=92s = misgivings would=20 have been overcome had he known of the Soviets' actual preparations, and = their=20 greater readiness to assist the Syrians.

At the White = House,=20 Thompson =93was impressed how much greater Soviet sensibility there was = to the=20 plight of the Syrians than to that of the Egyptians. At the time, the = Syrians=20 were the apple of the Russians=92 eye.=94(70) In Tel Aviv on June 8, a = West German=20 diplomat passed on to his American counterpart the warning by Chuvakhin = two days=20 earlier, now adding the interpretation of "this threat to mean that USSR = might=20 take more direct action against Israel if [its army] now proceeds = completely=20 [to] destroy Syrian armed forces causing [the] Soviet-supported regime = there to=20 fall.=94(71) Barbour cabled Washington the information, and the secret = dispatch=20 was =93passed to secretary of state and White House=94 immediately but, = like the=20 other intimations of a Soviet intervention this one, too, does not = appear to=20 have been relayed to the Situation Room.(72)

After Kosygin=92s = menacing=20 message was received, Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach was = dispatched=20 from the Situation Room to =93call in the Israeli ambassador and put = pressure on=20 the Israelis to accept a cease-fire.=94(73) The Israelis, presumably = informed of=20 the Soviet threat, soon did--after completing their conquest of the = Golan. The=20 Situation Room team learned of this by watching the televised = proceedings of the=20 Security Council. (74)

But earlier = McNamara,=20 though he now maintains he was unaware of the naval nature of the Soviet = menace,=20 suggested to his colleagues a precisely appropriate response. The main = task=20 force of the Sixth Fleet had been circling in the central Mediterranean, = intentionally remote from the theater of war. On June 6, Johnson had=20 remonstrated on the hotline to Kosygin over the Soviet media's repeating = Nasser=92s =93wholly false and obviously invented charge that a U.S. = carrier=20 aircraft had participated in attacks on Egypt.=85You know where our = carriers=20 are.=94(75) When the Liberty was attacked, Johnson took care to inform = Kosygin=20 that the carrier USS Saratoga was ordered =93to dispatch aircraft to = investigate.=20 We wish you to know that investigation is the sole purpose.=94(76) On = June 10,=20 says McNamara, the fleet was still =93steaming west, toward Gibraltar, = on a=20 training exercise.=94(77) =20

According to = Helms's=20 memoir, the secretary of defense, =93Asked whether we should turn the = Sixth Fleet=20 around to sail toward the Eastern Mediterranean. Thompson and Helms = agreed.=20 Helms pointed out that Soviet submarines monitoring the fleet's = operations would=20 report immediately to Moscow. The president was informed and agreed to = send the=20 fleet eastward.=94(78) Unlike the Soviet action, the essential = ingredient of=20 deterrence--informing the enemy--was ensured.

=93President = Johnson and I,=94=20 says McNamara, =93decided to turn the fleet around and send it back = toward Israel,=20 not to join with Israel in an attack on Syria--not at all--but to be = close=20 enough to Israel so, if the Soviets supported a Syrian attack on Israel, = we=20 could come to Israel=92s defense with the fleet, [to] prevent Israel = from being=20 annihilated. The annihilation of Israel as a nation ...was Nasser=92s = objective=20 then, and perhaps=85the Soviets intended to support [it].=94(79)=20

According to the version that filtered = down to=20 Khripunkov's crew, =93[Communist Party First Secretary Leonid] Brezhnev = and the=20 president got on the phones and realized that half an hour after we = landed the=20 world would be in ruins. And that was that.=94(80) His ship, which had = at last=20 been ordered to head for the Israeli coast, was turned back after coming = within=20 30 to 40 miles of the beach. (81) The landing was aborted. The = interpreters=20 waiting in Alexandria were taken off alert. (82) In his memoirs, = Khrushchev=20 acknowledges that the American "McNamara Doctrine" of flexible response = was=20 vindicated in 1967. (83)

Why was such a complex, risky and = expensive=20 operation activated in the first place, only to be postponed and finally = abandoned at such cost to Soviet prestige? Preliminary evidence points = to a=20 dispute within the Soviet leadership.

Khaldeev, who at = the time=20 was a journalist and writer in Baku, reports hearing from members of the = Communist elite there of rumors from Moscow that at least twice there = were=20 pitched debates in the Politburo whether to go ahead with the landing. = (84) At=20 least one of these occasions was confirmed first-hand by Yegorichev in = an=20 interview: =93I happened to overhear such a heated discussion when I = phoned=20 Brezhnev. Kosygin was giving a speech in a meeting of a [small group] = there, and=20 categorically stated that we have no right to intervene in this war and = should=20 not=85.I know Kosygin opposed the use of direct force in this = conflict.=94=20 Yegorichev is certain that Kosygin=92s message to Johnson on June 10 = conflicted=20 with the premier's own opinion, and must have been imposed on him by the = Politburo which had to approve such a measure.(85) =

But caution = finally=20 prevailed in the Politburo as well. On June 10, after Soviet action was = openly=20 threatened and then called off, Moscow broke diplomatic ties with = Israel. A=20 Soviet Foreign Ministry insider has since reported that =93at the = Politburo=20 meeting it was [Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko who at the last moment = proposed=20 the break so as to avoid getting embroiled in the large-scale military = adventure=20 that our =91hawks=92 were insisting on...This [break with Israel] was a = bone that=20 was thrown to our =91hawks=92. Gromyko was afraid that we would get into = a clash=20 with the United States.=94(86) =93Hawks=94 presumably refers to Andropov = and Grechko,=20 the latter described by Yegorichev as =93a rough soldier = (soldafon), no=20 politician.=94(87) Gromyko later said that maintaining Israel's presence = was more=20 beneficial to Soviet interests that eliminating it: =93As long as = hostility=20 dominates in the Middle East we are needed there=85If...we behave wisely = then=20 again we will be very much needed.=94 A close military advisor to = Andropov at the=20 time, Nikolai V. Ogarkov (later Marshal) confided in 1991: =93Thank God = that under=20 the [Soviet] feudal regime, we only had Afghanistan. There might have = been=20 Poland, the Middle East, and=85 frightening to contemplate, nuclear = war=85.Even such=20 things were discussed.=94(88)

Immediately after = the=20 crisis, Yegorichev was deposed, but Andropov and Grechko were promoted = and the=20 =93hawkish=94 line remained active. One military goal was achieved: = Soviet naval=20 bases were established in Syria and enhanced. In Egypt, where Amer was = ousted=20 and committed suicide, the Soviets retained a high military profile. = Khripunkov=20 was promoted and made gunnery officer of a three-ship Soviet flotilla = stationed=20 at Port Said, the northern entrance of the Suez Canal, now the = Egyptian-Israeli=20 front line. =93We had the Israelis ahead and the Egyptians astern. Every = morning=20 at a quarter to four o'clock I would go on the bridge and have the crew = load our=20 guns and train them on the Israeli trenches.=94 There, Khripunkov says, = he=20 =93witnessed the Israeli navy's tragedy=94--apparently alluding to the = sinking of=20 the destroyer Eilat off the Sinai coast October 21 by missiles = fired from=20 Port Said. These have hitherto been attributed to Egyptian missile boats = of=20 Soviet make, assisted by Soviet advisors; Khripunkov, hints that Soviet=20 involvement was more important and says the Egyptian navy was incapable = of=20 sinking the ship. But he declined to elaborate on this incident. (89) In = his=20 1970 interrogation, Khrushchev was told by the chairman of the party = Control=20 Commission, R.E. Melnikov: =93The struggle continues, Egypt has not been = defeated.=94(90)

By February 1968, a CIA cable spoke of =93the first information = received=20 regarding Soviet plans to participate in a limited Arab offensive = against=20 Israel.=85The Soviets will actively aid the Arabs in gaining back the = territory=20 lost in the June 1967 war.=94 The document, recently declassified in a = heavily=20 censored form, states however that =93the Soviets made it very clear = that Israel=20 is here to stay and they will not...facilitate its = destruction.=94(91)

But according to a high-ranking officer = directly=20 involved, even the nuclear option against Israel was still not ruled out = in=20 defense of an Arab ally. Captain First Class (and later vice-admiral) = N.A.=20 Shishkov, then commanding a submarine armed with P-6 (SS-12) nuclear = missiles,=20 has disclosed that in the spring of 1968 he was =93personally ordered by = Soviet=20 Navy commander S. Gorshkov to stand by for firing eight missiles at the = Israeli=20 coast if Americans and Israelis began a landing in Syria.=94(92) And as = late as=20 1981, then former Prime Minister Rabin stated, in a closed lecture at = Israel's=20 National Security College, that he =93still feared direct Soviet = military=20 involvement in Arab-Israeli wars, and even envisioned, under certain=20 geopolitical circumstances, a possible Soviet landing on the shores of=20 Israel.=94(93)

Thus, Soviet plans for military=20 intervention in the Middle East, even those not actually implemented, = had=20 important effects on the behavior of all those countries directly = involved in=20 the conflict there.

NOTES

1. Memorandum of Conversation, "The = Hotline=20 Exchanges," Ambassador Llewellyn E Thompson and Mr. Nathaniel Davis, = November 4=20 1968. National Security File, NSC Histories, container 19 v.7, LBJ = Presidential=20 Library.

2. Kosygin to = Johnson, June=20 10 1967, Russian and English versions, loc.cit.

3. Christopher = Andrew and=20 Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, London: Penguin 2000,=20 pp.473-475.

4. Nikita S. = Khrushchev,=20 Vremya. Ludi. Vlast, memoirs in four volumes, Moscow: MN, 1999v. = 3,=20 p.435; v.4 p.460.

5. Department of = State=20 Memorandum of conversation G/PM:RLGarthoff:pep:5-29-67, confidential. = Brezhnev=20 had spoken at a conference of Communist parties at Karlovy Vary,=20 Czechoslovakia.

6. Isabella = Ginor, "Still=20 Answering Cautiously" (Hebrew), Ha'Aretz, July 5 1991. =

7. Department of = State incoming=20 telegram 21704, Ambassador Tel Aviv to secretary of state, secret, May = 21=20 1967.

8. Nadav Safran, = From=20 War To War, New York: Pegasus, 1969, p. 274n, quoting deposed = Egyptian Minister of War Shams al Din Badran at his trial, according to = al=20 Ahram, February 25 1968. Also Jerusalem Post, February 28=20 1968.

9. John Barron: = KGB,=20 New York: Bantam, 1974, pp. 39-84.

10. Yevgeny M. = Primakov,=20 articles in Pravda. April 23, May 15, 26 and 28 1967, among = others.=20

11. Maj.Gen. V.A. = Zolotaryov (ed.), Rossiya (SSSR) v Lokalnikh Voynakh I Voyennykh = Konfliktakh=20 Vtoroi Poloviny XX Veka, Moskva: Institut Voyennoi Istorii = Ministerstva=20 Oborony RF, 2000, p.185. This details the makeup of the assembled fleet = in the=20 Mediterranean as ten submarines and 30 surface ships in full battle = readiness =96=20 which corresponds to the account below. This book lists the 1967, = 1969-70, 1973=20 and 1982 Arab-Israeli wars all as conflicts in which Soviet forces=20 participated.

12. Department of = State=20 incoming telegram 029457, Embassy Cairo to secretary of State, = immediate-secret,=20 May 28 1967

13. Department of = State=20 incoming telegram 029229, Embassy Moscow to Secretary of State, secret, = May 27=20 1967; the source is identified as "Voslensky," probably Mikhail = Voslensky, a=20 historian and interpreter who later defected to the West. =

14. Department of = State=20 incoming telegram 027005, US Mission UN to Secretary of State, = confidential, May=20 25 1967.

15.Oleg Kalugin,=20 Proshchai Lubianka, Moscow: Olymp 1995, p.126. =

16.Department of = State=20 incoming telegram 004387, American Embassy Amman to Secretary of State,=20 priority-confidential, June 5 1967

17.Department of = State=20 incoming telegram 19193, secret, May 18 1967

18.First entry in = Chronology of US-USSR Consultations on the Middle East, May 18-June 10, = 1967,=20 top secret, State Department P/HO:HBCox:fh, June 15 1967. =

19. Department of = State=20 Incoming Telegram 020806 [copy of telegram to Defense Intelligence = Agency],=20 Confidential, May 19 1967

20. Chronology of = US-USSR=20 Consultations on the Middle East, op. cit.

21. Department of = State=20 outgoing telegram 198916, from Rusk to Embassies Tel Aviv, Cairo and = Mission UN,=20 secret, May 20 1967.

22. Sedov's = status as a=20 staffer of the KGB "residentura" in Washington was confirmed years after = by his=20 then superior, Kalugin, and others; pp.270-273

23. State = Department=20 Memorandum of conversation G/PM:RLGarthoff:pep:5-29-67, confidential; = also=20 quoted in Chronology of US-USSR Consultations on the Middle East, May = 18-June=20 10, 1967, top secret, State Department P/HO:HBCox:fh, June 15 1967=20

24. "Obzor = Svedenii o=20 Polozhenii na Blizhnem Vostoke," CPSU Central Committee. top secret, May = 26=20 1967. Facsimile in V. Kirpichenko, Iz Arkhiva Razvedchika, = Moscow:=20 Mezhdunarodnyie Otnosheniya, 1993, pp. 317-8. Only the first two pages = of the=20 document are reproduced, so that any recommendation for Soviet policy is = omitted. A handwritten note in the margin states that the two other = copies were=20 destroyed on June 6.

25. Department of = State=20 Memorandum of conversation EUR:SOV:MToon:erk, secret, May 26 1967 with = attached=20 letter; Draft letter to Eshkol, National S Council History file, Middle = East=20 Crisis, vol.2, box 17; Department of State outgoing telegram 203943, = From=20 Secretary of State to Embassy Tel Aviv, "Flash -literally for eyes only = of=20 Ambassador," May 27 1967

26. Department of = State=20 incoming telegram 029479, American Embassy Moscow to secretary of State, = confidential, May 28 1967.

27. Zolotaryov, = op. cit.,=20 p. 187.

28. Interview = with Robert=20 S. McNamara, Jerusalem, March 27, 2000.

29. Memorandum of = Conversation, McGeorge Bundy and Nathaniel Davis, "The Hotline Meetings = and the=20 Middle East in New York," November 7 1968, National Security File, NSC=20 Histories, container 19 v.7, LBJ Presidential Library. =

30. Department of = State=20 incoming telegram 007778, >From Embassy Tel Aviv to Secretary of = State,=20 immediate, June 8 1967 1218

31. Kosygin to = Johnson,=20 June 10 1967, National Security File, NSC Histories, container 19 v.7, = LBJ=20 Presidential Library.

32. Thompson and = Davis,=20 loc.cit.

33. Department of = State=20 incoming telegram 007778, Embassy Tel Aviv to secretary of State, = secret, June 8=20 1967.

34. Thompson and = Davis,=20 loc.cit.

35. Harold H. = Saunders,=20 Memorandum for the Record, October 22 1968, National Security File, NSC=20 Histories, container 19 v.7, LBJ Presidential Library. =

36. Kosygin to = Johnson,=20 June 10 1967, loc. cit.

37. McNamara, = loc.cit.=20

38. Telephone = interview=20 with Anatoly F. Dobrynin, October 10 2000

39. Bundy and Davis, loc. cit.

40. McNamara, = loc.cit.=20

41. Aleksandr = Khaldeev,=20 =93Nesostoyavshiisya Desant=94, Okna (Tel Aviv), September 14 = 2000.=20

42. Telephone = interview=20 with Yuri Khripunkov, August 1999.

43. List in = Turkish=20 attached to secret Israel Foreign Ministry memo, Minister in Ankara = D.Laor to=20 Deputy Director-General Y. Tekoa, June 1 1967.

44. Department of = State=20 incoming telegram 028300, copy of cable from Defense Attache's Office = Tel Aviv=20 to Defense Intelligence Agency, secret, May 26 1967 =

45. The source = requested=20 anonimity

46. Khripunkov,=20 loc.cit.

47. Telephone = interview=20 with Valery A. Yaremenko, October 25 2000, He says that according to = established=20 procedure, the order must have been approved at the level of Defense = Minister or=20 by the Politburo, of which the latter was a member. =

48. Khripunkov, = loc.=20 cit.

49. Department of = State=20 incoming telegram 008002, Embassy Tel Aviv to Secretary of State, = secret, June 8=20 1967

50. Dobrynin, = loc.=20 cit.

51. Yefim Segal = and Zinovi=20 Dubrovski, "Ne dolzhny Molchat'," Novosti Nedeli, Tel Aviv, March = 2 2000;=20 Telephone interview with Nikolai G. Yegorichev, November 11 2000.=20

52. Christopher = Andrew and=20 Oleg Gordievsky, KGB, (no location): Nota Bene, [Russian = translation of=20 same title in English, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990] 1992 p. = 503=20

53. Khripunkov, = loc.=20 cit.

54. Yuri V. = Nastenko:=20 "Aviatsiya v Egypte," in Grif "Sekretno" Sniat, Moscow: Committee = of=20 Veterans of Military Actions in Egypt, 1998. =

55. Personal = communication=20 from Prof. Ze'ev Katz, June 2000

56. Department of = State=20 Memorandum 10104, Garthoff to Foy D. Kohler, secret, June 10 1967.=20

57. Dobrynin, = loc. cit.=20 Dobrynin had, and apparently still bears, a personal grudge against = Sedov, whom=20 he later resented for monopolizing Soviet contacts with people close to = Richard=20 Nixon, such as Henry Kissinger. Andrew and Mitrokhin, op. cit.,=20 pp.270-273).

58. Department of = State=20 incoming telegram 007482, American Embassy Ankara to Secretary of State, = secret,=20 June 8 1967

59. McNamara, = loc.=20 cit.

60. Khripunkov, = loc.=20 cit.

61. Michael B. = Oren, =93The=20 USS Liberty: Case Closed=94, Azure, Jerusalem: Shalem Center, = Spring=20 2000.

62. Randolph = S./Winston S.=20 Churchill, The Six-Day War, London: Heinemann/Penguin 1967, = p.100.=20

63. Zolotaryov, op.cit., pp. 186-7.

64. Khripunkov, = loc.=20 cit.

65. Khrushchev, = op. cit.,=20 v.4 p.242

66. Central Intelligence Agency = Intelligence=20 Information Cable 65699, October 6 1967; CIA Office of National = estimates=20 Special Memorandum 10-67, November 21 1967. CIA Freedom of Information = Act=20 website (www.foia.ucia.gov/scripts)

67. Central Intelligence Agency = Intelligence=20 Information Cables 21647, July 31 1967 and 49185, February 14 1968, loc. = cit.

68. Khrushchev, = op.cit.,=20 v.3 p.622

69. Yosef Govrin, = Israel-USSR Relations 1953-1967 (Hebrew), Jerusalem: Magnes Press = 1990,=20 pp. 266-7, quoting an interview with Dayan. An earlier biography of = Dayan=20 presents a somewhat different version: =93After the rout of Egypt and = Jordan, he=20 argued that the Soviet Union would under no circumstances countenance = harm to=20 Syria, whose regime was so close to it=85but [once a cease-fire had been = established with Egypt and a war on two fronts no longer loomed] he = dropped his=20 fear of Soviet intervention.=94 Shabtai Tevet, Moshe Dayan = (Hebrew),=20 Jerusalem: Schocken, 1973, pp. 580-81.

70. Thompson and = Davis,=20 loc.cit.

71. Department of = State=20 incoming telegram 007778; see note 30.

72. Ibid.=20

73. Saunders, = loc.=20 cit.

74.Thompson and = Davis,=20 loc.cit.

75. Johnson to = Kosygin,=20 June 6 1967 10:03 am, Johnson to Kosygin, June 6 1967 10:03 am, National = Security File, NSC Histories, container 19 v.7, LBJ Presidential = Library.=20

76. Johnson to = Kosygin,=20 June 8 1967 11:00 am, Johnson to Kosygin, June 6 1967 10:03 am, National = Security File, loc. cit.

77. McNamara, = loc.=20 cit.

78. Saunders, = loc.=20 cit.

79. McNamara, = loc.=20 cit.

80. Khripunkov, = loc.=20 cit.

81. Khipunkov, = written=20 communication to author, July 3 2000.

82. Aleksandr = Khaldeev,=20 loc.cit.

83. Khrushchev, = op. cit.,=20 v.4 p.242.

84. Khaldeev, = personal=20 communication to author, October 2000.

85. Yegorichev,=20 loc.cit.

86. Alexei = Vasilyev,=20 Rossiya na Blizhnem i Srednem Vostoke: Ot Messianstva k Pragmatizmu,=20 Moskva: Nauka, 1993, pp.82-3.

87. Yegorichev,=20 loc.cit.

88. Oleg = Grinevsky,=20 Tainy Sovetskoy Diplomatii, Moskva: Vagrius 2000, pp.11-12, = 335.=20

89. Khripunkov, = telephone=20 interview.

90. Khrushchev, op. cit., v.3 = p.622.

91. Central Intelligence Agency = Intelligence=20 Information Cable 49185, February 14 1968, loc. cit.

92. Nikolai Cherkashin, =93On Dolzhen = Byl=20 Unichtozhit=92 Izrail=92=94, Yevreiskiye Vesti (supplement to = Golos Ukrainy,=20 organ of Ukrainian parliament), #17-18, September 1996.

93. Efraim Inbar, Rabin and = Israel=92s National=20 Security, Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Baltimore: = Johns=20 Hopkins University Press, 1999, p.12.

Isabella Ginor was born in the = USSR and=20 immigrated to Israel shortly before the events described in this = article. Since=20 1986 she has been a specialist on the USSR and its successor states for = the=20 newspapers Al HaMishmar and subsequently Ha=92aretz, and a = frequent=20 commentator on the broadcast media. Dr. Ginor is also a correspondent = for the=20 BBC World Service, Radio France International and the Australian SBS = network in=20 Russian, as well as for the Russian newspaper Vremya Novostei. In = 1993=20 she was writer-in-residence at the Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew = Studies,=20 Oxford University.

Back = to=20 Journal Volume 4 Number 4 Index=20

[MERIA=20 HOMEPAGE]

------=_NextPart_000_0000_01C7F497.C12895D0 Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: http://meria.idc.ac.il/images/meria.gif R0lGODlhZgFtAPcAAAAAAAgAAAgICBAAABAICBgAABgICCEAACEICCEQECEYGCkAACkICCkQECkY GCkhITEAADEICDEQEDEYGDEhITkAADkQEDkYGDkhITkxMUIAAEIQEEIYGEIhIUIpKUIxMUoAAEoQ EEoYGEohIUoxMVIAAFIYGFIhIVIpKVIxMVI5OVoAAFoYGFohIVopKVoxMVo5OWMAAGMYGGMhIWMp KWMxMWM5OWNCQmsAAGshIWspKWsxMWs5OWtCQmtKSmtSUnMAAHMhIXMpKXMxMXM5OXNCQnNKSnNj Y3sAAHshIXspKXsxMXs5OXtCQntKSntSUoQAAIQICIQpKYQxMYQ5OYRCQoRKSoRSUoRaWoRjY4wQ EIwYGIwpKYwxMYw5OYxCQoxKSoxaWoxjY4xzc5QhIZQpKZQxMZQ5OZRCQpRKSpRSUpRaWpRjY5wx MZw5OZxCQpxKSpxSUpxaWpxjY5xzc6VCQqVKSqVSUqVaWqVjY6Vra6V7e61SUq1aWq1jY61ra7Vj Y7Vra7Vzc7WMjL1zc717e72EhL2MjMaEhMaMjMaUlM6UlM6cnM6lpdalpdatrda1td61td69vd7G xufGxufOzufW1u/W1u/e3u/n5/fn5/fv7/f39//39/////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////////////////////////////////////////////////////yH5BAEAAJ4ALAAAAABmAW0A AAj+AHEAQYIEihkoBRMiXIikDpI7gRhCcSNRYcE7FxW6sVixTRszbThapHjwzUSEJhWmlEhR5MKV SPq4THiQZEiYFUlWhGIIp0IzCSli7MNzp0WHUHy2DMmwjdGnBTciRFrwoMg7ThPe8SnRoFWPBSMW ZIokJdWKW88KgioTYUsoW+8gNOTWaEiyOzHWLSiQIEKrUAvBHQkVSqCHhGcy7SN1psOSg+Ey5Irk rUjLcmdCWQzYskS5QD/TLRwS6ZvMjQqXPb2TrGXPmi2alFy1sNTZsRe2RdIG0MrGcnfnhaKIYean mVO6MWly60mXBwFffrmwb8KzHN/Y6SO8IOWFbbj+Um7p5jBUOyfXxlzPcHT2p433wkdINOp5nHcS dX+qfmJLwbG9wVV8jWWl2k5QyFTfRLmZsWBuCbUhlRuKkEedXiK11V9MqjEHBRR+fMjcG9ixxBtU ryFkHX0ztXTHfg+heFxixk212ocZrrebSd1Rhp5ISkGFUVoJffeicQIemFFmy8H13UVQlIghdZVB iByHMTZIm5IvrWWSG3jdMWNFMrnh2YMI3iEUdeUV5qFmGGa2YkGAcKQmQovZqViWFeHUVnMiGqUg iAsJpZCBdg7HEWwMcVdkoBke50eduKnm4knNjWlRcmj1CSmXHNFln2ZvGOgcqHIliYQguCUSG3r+ JkmHpkuCgIWSQxsa1RycuvE1kELdzWjVrJrC9RZXzxGH0rLekVnWls/CJJ1EPsH4JHeTMfvZbgqi pyReqhoC40IYVspedk8qCWC6xTI602yCpArXHduRuqysEBpinndu1JFutGwpJNeczN5xlnRjTllQ d+4KVV9K5noml61aJVWovQIb5S5cxalk8U6igrXxdAIjJe5TMOHnElag6opefByNW1ax70EZSEva WewSj39lm5u+DCWyZmxy5VrzSQQ39KxCIXossEX7bezqsh9qShZGpb73G6+PusRoeT6hZzQUa93J m5XNPj2RSR3nRC2O0FI7srpkB+xmYTOWiSn+XGJ1isSP0pmbV6lkJWIj3s9CBZMbSb+xls9vP0qu rnBHZSZCcmEuUlY/Jvn2bE+mXHnk5N7mqU/iroRXbj5BjJ6opGuUEVR1tvxeITPRjJaRT0slrnel ogVlbQXpbJRzd0FRiHIdGr8z3IHMGZ7zPypqvO4qo7QhZcH9Xf3TTEJFleBqX3Qcsn0nZEhxmM8t 2+i41dtT5TRDPLpK7qvmHOxFfl/Yh4zCCYlmJ6bMeKRGU7KMTLZQCDTRay9vWJ58XPKxdK3kDSsC F0L8975mReZ55mOIYKhkFMMhwT0+c4jMDjc38kjMJU3TXvV0t7KdrCQ4dhBdDWlosX8JiTb+lcrf VWYEmyThRBDjKxjkntUHT3iCDApp223YV5kDbaSFDOlLk2RXoqA48YtgDCMYXfWmCxVKSNwp1mw2 gpstiPGNYlyIIOBIxzra8Y6eIGFZ6oDHPjoRE5KoBCQaUYg6QNF2L7pOxSThxzsCCCU5HB1F3kIk 522JIphw4tRisptJCsg0B0qeZiwjkGmNpYrQkYQkNOFHTWxBVdnSy8iQ8ojnQWYhhfCjKlWJkjdU YpesbKQw75g2PBmkEpYI5DD9mAlI9OGQEEokdVKiiF0u0xOZ+KUkaneRSGptJX6Q0CfdcIdCzAgQ X9REVBYnFIeUUTPRaV5BvoAGIBhlbFf+KQQj78iIftEIa/NBQkQUVpcybiET/JwWOXF0OSSQoRDB vKZEofg9pgzJYL6UKB4rMaud5MoQNGsDI/qoiUJsYSs+Mef93OCb0xhCX+FhROVgiYRKgHFQ+AMo RXw4SdZV51d94mFC+hAXhNYxE1vAC2a6SB0ztKREu9rNHO0YLDUuZAuZpCMjGFEIRhiCq4YoRCHC OlaxkjWsiZBEVsW40KBoC6QICUQjd6nWPlaiDJqRUMZ0dwdGRBSOltiCBxXWMSQ6NWchWkjdHkJU 8OiMDGG0hF4Zsh2cTs+nqETZT/3isQ9eSXkPuWMfyCJA8jFrQUVMyozWCsdHPuRaVbn+Qx3rtBzT zoSoDxXjvqiWErngDiEjhaMmesKV8CSCtXCU2YNqx5VyxqqOmjjklN6wlJZ2RWmTcVzpDKKzRIgR TSaZ2nHwaaLN5EZOQHXrqOCTEPXYtI6YSJxnaPo5y+CEIhLSzR0FuxmK6A9MSKjjzQzhL4N5RELL 2c4nJdSGQNwBrmZgbQyXZl6kNAkudKxE8UiWoL++0bWNutgZI3Qzhrz3jYzoWlPKA4j7Tc4+/jlO Ig4il4OKUabqxfEFTUiazN7WV5xNVjE5Ip06UGSqdXSUT4xMuTvkCloH2RByxVgJEoWkPB8Rp5Wd Sq9SBcIMlKAjhf63Ya9MJjwRtQz+Uq7MEPW4EY6S2Fh8thBmAXPkI5iLXB3CGSo61sddglBE+vzG 3bNFxg99aE4T38jftxymUvKKzU7dwCoO5hkJc9rPbxf1vvDcERNQ4LF6U3tCFx8HKNxswx0tgSdG XZc+d6jzG9tmpdBwBMNOnC6eBJgZOkpidQyBzSPs6KchL4QRN6OVmAtdkbVQZNPOek7g3NDYCE7Z iWULyjtlYtuXvCEiOEJpwqCwIhhp6lTAmghk7yiIqBk7Wt9pC0jecmI6PsJsBxJTG/pghkaIWYgM gsp7FTE9bu5WfQipNxh/7TWjKDyMroxQTUTCCFrnhI5QBHY5n4NSF8tEL3hByIz+40pHUO9GhXmL CpzW1ZUEcUdBmP4VX2u0Ez94B4+Y6FGjMpZoFyeEUltUtSOtJCD/5RKOnr0tN58SXAD1oRG+WTqw iLJPMUqCe0bZgofDiGOD5HckHbPtG+hoaIG1RS9ESUq1sAQbumAEEnXcZEqwVbFTkkkumemowBQB COswFUtxy5gZxv7FTdBx3zWqO32IIlRAFKclwXWi4T+sGkBkjiNHfyPg33WgZzoRQHjf9xs62gdA VD2MkkhQjoxiCDtC0ST88wpegB2VZQsM7yxSfa8mU5+oiQrJcITEiI+keIkdpy0Tfkr0BjK3oSiu JWAEfhghgSHsUNLlEOqD4eT+su4/PvzzKBu9ZjIfRxq2tTAyQUImAURO4vVh0Bj5vidST1CCCkz+ mvwb7NJY9p4B6fDGoXIf1B09VzyiMit90DHe5Xpl10BOgycXETa6Fxt9IBBo0CF6txCwA0ZucG1O RAZWARtMQU4rpBG/AwWRN3+W0FoVYQZmgBSFQX5htDANByHcNFKCARITpHHyl3o+IXUV0XolJxfF UYCBx2waQUfeBkDgMVS3tkXqMSYmIVM2ZkeuAhjQRmG80X73wyMQ0gY4AAf2FBt1IDPkdBxgNHpa xWZE5nV/8y1uQBdvJnlIcHpg9EgSYkqBoYR8MlQluHsLM39QwE2WYUptYIf+X+SDHUGBdmQw+pEx m/N/cFQZuIEXgGF/9DE/wEYRKbZoTrR1nygdjyM58/YdFnUgaZBedtGHwZZ7AfZFmORniRMzvEF7 ebEafXVTUICIn1cqMKMk/jaJluRDApgQD+UHrgUTJWIGvCiIPmaLFmFUrXV+/Xc010FH5kIWYQIn p5GNBeEq0pgJnihG/DNoYBIfbcEdIOGCtfIGPVEHIDF6gEBUdhAXOIADpHJDLPEWu5GGZENHhSBq EsFnQkQUfSAIhjB5nhBxzfgItkMuMghGN9GKRKcx/PgZO7GCb5R6sxhwsYF/niAYGFKCmuIGfKhH mMEWxNF1aVMJQudEjAH+ip6ACcexW2agKX8mEQdxhAqhIqrYWUNFkYAIRnIok5qwSZ8hIIiCfoxQ CYUAfADSjCCGNnQRkV+0NiJCjLShCC/HHV+WaNyhCCTiBoIBIx4oCcNDNbFhlV/UQIuXfbJxkuei LW+4MgXRiXOXEIoAd380EQv4Rg5SEAACj9UIa5dRl4VxjyC0c9j3GQnBgTKRglzHeobBJb31BmsV cbvIgmijG8BFdkkxP5bpchi5k2kJKJvSjBypjxDClp8XIn+oeLWHdMY2bi5hUZ2DG+93hwYxjlwX ExCRM3aHedMhVOT2kzz5QByWhmYyh2KkCabEZAeHIpjzl56AY3cgf1P+6SbHIZlg5B1IhDYCsnbM NntVIhGHCGfFQxGBgJTjV0cNZJyy8xJ8uJQ+Zkk/MRUrwSr0MWyfKFgfwZeMxhsE1xQuMZ2o5D5J 4y7aBR0LwYFmUAYoCJDouRFsWBiA8QZ/lQjOIZWgIh1m4JoVVpgiUUg2BIELIR13YREhoZopGk5C ZJ1itHGd2X8mSZum5Bm/aHc1UReqlZBfhGNgIltwxAgRehCjRTw6aV5us6MSoQSqqIfypTEP+kVN YwbdJ0aYIB21s6KqQRXolIhL46FW4hkhengCGKFP0Qa50geSQHdCNi1jYhUuWhl0QYyBAJKxhzYG 4gdKGJ2cpihMYRL+eFFvUNRT0hhGmFAGWXMrOboWtHehMzEF6cUoYjJinoIQYNSlSOCdXwQ7l/MW UroQE5aoEno2ZIp+3XEQnupE6oWiGrFF7eEJbSMcsIEmdApnToKVsTE90CWfO0FjfgpHehgkegJB M2II0kgJWOIU0gdGd1AGRrgqSDFvQhkhHekSX/ArcPqACZF8acmB5PKSWroQhzEj9ikRCgIRYKRh KZqqMwGEeySiKsYnjlIsOGiu3ooQGwIYqsmhkGQbmFNHjACsRCYXN/pGx5Opm0IfuvEndgCV6XMH zhlGj+BUKEguDzY/x6oS/7KtJNpYMWM9acg0siZGa5FiSYeJSOD+G21xequjkWK0ncCSIXDhmhqh rrWyMEaxfg5bPgshamTRjJkgQuLTGAL6Rm1gsJMBCCUBmh2EkTWzGwDiLSeGCZOyGy+Cf2ajfd/2 IVWDH50yN9t6gW34YxKxaeKqFeQaRk45QWr5EgbTGFlqCRwhs2FEs3CrFehBrxOUJDdjTvtBpE6X eBKhsj7WjJXAEIOWnxFSR5XAtEPFZgkbR4tyolFrP4NHH2N0IWsRpih2hqkChDQlhUi4E1OgB0FW FQHiNgXhjyrhgZ5QS+n6G6pSKf4JkxUBr5PBVFvkt6jkOdryEU7VB4WgCODXhzAipBKhmqKarnOG t2JUBiz7FKX+Z7tymaKYa7QU5hTHkbuaEEN9RRQhIZObcHAD1BVgYhX3NTdzEKWjqkgsUaVOBBvI G3weyRKeUzw3BEbxtbucKbX3hEtyOZ6VUwdGYQdV2AjGSyKjN626MSTNq6tfcrpftxC5+2HYhTbd 423Ze5+vWnezER0jGFG15MDggQcUQkfuyW3u4hHmQl8cAbL1ijiOWbk+cVx0JK8fAW6JEUG6yBG8 y4qbMhsiBbX+EjEJDAW5KxgpUwcfQU4O/Aj1MsEbaT79Z0oZLEapAcLhh5/PepUNKxLYUT1ZAQh4 NS/jCMFjEQgaCkegVrOtpiuBYCD7axRpgI8G8XfWExQUsbb+xrHF7ToZYEIuY9wGVbiQ/GUR8Ooo UME+GyGECns50EIzdVAG9SZBOduTCwMJxDVOPfiWTLKUWyDIC3dpB2LEIiFXtMmY1qh7oYGUdCGz wjcTFdeMnpDGNHitinVF/uUcMxGGQBC/7MW9sHsxWodxL5J2kPhiZsDKyQvAlFeMT1EcgdAWrunG y0GWy1EHhtDNZkIihfAI0huS3ug2MgW2CeGB7qqcItsoMvl5MRKb0kQZfCSMzQw1FlE7eEVtUUSu tEdOiVCPWTqZQbkpltYS9GhpCYEDg+CkueEZHQPIoxKMb9TFC1sQVwoFa7UJ0GTFM0uXduGABKxR /FRei+L+yAqRVnD2Ij3xUo2wElvQB7LrCZUgFTIhryum0RlYuWHkmIIykGAJEV3Jd9KICRKyzHcA CEwBCCFyB0kbRouMdR17B4rwd2mQBqsLKo72hsfMJwUNRppJxk7II2Bkt0bhocYZmCJk0ie9ryp3 qQpBFy6aOWO5BYLQlHYkjknpczpzB40QCJZnJkQlIFvhmudIL8RlZMuBUeYEj2QpEztLFvW4xp/l B1tBR/0BjfQFE4y3HxhUTw+ZNg8DBRQNE60aksUswRwdfU/RkLF5zZjn1naE0e/WX8ajCB3TjJog CZZQCb+UqJDLoSHqEWBSesuRRlH8lOP0FGBLeAoLlBX+cRZDgsCAMSlIkHlxTDlIIJat/UbbbWsI IquGNoEGcyg4kAdb3Zmy+sdfxJpe4ZtiPUp7VBVghGwzMcQedbrZLWbURV2BcDPb/N+AQE6FAAlb 51rQW0UtgZS43Eia8Ah+gB4uiGc0EanFI2TwAbUazqIq4U5MARJMEVFZyBBUcSdhnGv+dzfYyq9N ARIygQOiXaPBRhUhAchYMxt9ENVBPDjPUW9mQF6q+SpOvBN+yyDH0YTqylqupYcAZjG58uB+tDxI IRaWYeEpqlRWgrOYujltZjE91RLDupAfTSMtiwQVC0a1DI3UkhIGsqdmwjhAAAej7eLYCruPAKfk W3L+msGx5KphVFQR2rkx3cMVqU0lwZJ1TXwoiwIYjwCEvF0I4dzYdRQSdrBJUwIUKzEt4g0nPg1G hnsVCPc33LYla4WWq9gUIZHaGcclqrU0qQE5AlG9vTqBBgFGDpYrZlIQ+Kd3ToYjKbi06VoQ5fx5 AYQRndiFkmy5WhtiM4FV0QwjbmAVjAAjirsgx1ZydbIgwqJ6ozW/EPIlJ1mC64oUCVgfPwK6nmDb 6GkRIIEEZkBHqQHR1isZsPQg90jrT2EV6CquOBFDronWHBERJlG3ZbEx8kcXMMMthnFnyqOEMKPQ udF0gLiEZKN3zfi/HCG7eV4+BoLqcgwhsHKSPOT+yBShfV3zBpFXCRZHEyCTcMI1ZjTeBwqfdxbR F902E53hHdZ5x9kdbLILbOLVqbo4kSLhgey3EEvnz+W17GG0ibY+E8P6SPsRIoKw7WkNRzedF/GM lKSFEiCGoEFdGSdJ751aKPnxJx/SBlnaBiWupLEKIn7WraDixiJZESALcC1eFXhGrtSYPugx5lTG EQ5ZFs4ZxyFBM8Ldlsa01D/hY+8MvGj/hVDASk5HZA7yYtJMZYziYHSUCYBxiVCcv7H5s0nBh813 5tTFxMV4pn9kocHaGuuhkG77cXq/LPHp7l+Aj/AOKr/hgoBxhz9BFrsR9CutECmYk4wiCKkKrlj+ zopcrs+dV4eqTcQqnXQLUdeE8QY8/kWLGxY/x+j4ab1JSJt7mnhEVSepZh8RJQmK8FVmZVZcVVZl FVZc9Qiye5N7+z9O5d0mDhA40ACBYgYKkoMJES5MeAfKG4gJ3ST0VNHTxIWBGL5JWMjix4qMGnJE uEWTRU1bEN5BglHhGzuUQFos9JCjQ4Zt3CwkqdDjzIoKD7YxyNBoQjMIE3mqiYSjQkOGhOIU6qYS UE+SkFBFUgfhG0UnsSo62AehIKFtnAo9ypDlS6yeyrI96KbnIzd97vSxC4hooD6Q4g4mDJTR061m 6bY9WMirS4cCkSBRu5itoT5QNLs9+LGn1IX+LpFsyRSXzFaOmZEI+lhooWqXbybekYS1kMOyRptC Ed0xblqEOy0jrOyxJu6MaIUqdoukNlBJB0lSFWlmcBuSfZhLBzScrWqJv5Fs57nZTqGbvKHgVNvn amH4hcmTH24G0HjKBs3iAAKnrnc37kjEMpw+wigRoypb6CfDbpLtIExQUumg+x7K7SDasHrEKPrW aovBmV5KqCfGeiLDjdO2A0Sj7zhE6LmZokOiKYfuOOwgReLS5I69oABvPN4Ya4sr6cTzairpbntI o/aCa6mN+KIcrBG27kDMssoUAS+QyPqTbrOp7JiIxCo7s+gmropSiIzByEiNpT4+EmmhCnf+Qmwi GEHarTyGKvxQvPUU6u0o4SZLSDFB7vuxoZESyvMjrTSLyMr/kHgPKEwa4nPQxTqsIy6E1FzJqTeO RCIRhzKrsSskGJHQQ5c6nIqkCIHKhC6bCFxIwPIe4W+1QBN0qVACoTCwDxLbWMxVrBjBL7NaKzrt 0FCVDQ2KR2liyw6FZEUIRJAqlWg4BUWckcISL3QUKxmhEIRSkqwNRCygNGLOWs04dZEuN+J6cCOI Sn1Nu4Lq5IhNixBUz8lgh6N0tbiI3AhMOgH2qqdfW/IxODd6K5cxljwDbcTFEAYqpZugtGhDETsu 16BsK9qTUVaHA/cjKD4uaDhTFQoEipH+0WoLIoljzqouN7wyVUHW4jLjKWIpE1JTut7wF183AuHo yp30cqMoohr76DR8KbNw6oWU2yIuS6bu2NyElHXIJSWAmMyg28hkGG3e5BRKb4UEa1a6Sz0xo4yX SErWOdsWu0Nfn+LSV1SFemaoEBaR+JkxP4UyWqtAJnqbz4ceiasSs65cSGeGKGeoX6yg8OOgQCqb iGTNeVMrbITojXRxyI3qDiHTsZpWSIzqYMugO0T9AodQzepwZL7v+Ghz3BdT+eSzPqJE6rKQ44oj o2dO2zuEBAfKMsA1PsrZuF0vSCfGPsf+YZLXe6NwkCjR13KfDcdqsQvd5t4wvs28iyP+djnU9Ual EKGhj4EIiRNWFDa1N1DvJXVgTh9wcIg4iM5HbMEe35BgHYuIpnOM4d9HMpMnsI2HLLs61EFaKLOq 5cw7d7iZRSzToUUhREs+W8gWUHTCCx3FaJhgiHaMwq239IFeM3nLUWTlrYN8Cis8bAq3npgQQ9TE DxG0lEVu9cCFzBB9TqzLDT2RkupJDAqAeJxOzJIGObgliCusj7HORC30WQ8rmDCZJ5hYl9QoxIs+ 0k75WvQlkEGhhxURUhCDyIghLkRMCblKIhQkq8/R7EfcWmAbDBGXTBxvOW3BYkvi0gf0wOSRW4FE ooSCwooMaCVCUSPapBcqP7xyhyv+UR2VBIE9/sDBLaJppUIqYyBA8i1aM5kmeChVxQsJzZGcKQ9d FHPK2FXSKNg8FSRp15CKTOgriwnlVrpVHoE9RH0z+R5dyBkk7wxwfW7QyXesFDBFAJBZb6wiV1aF vvRIbYofaVuxXtcQSNSIJPx5A8AqZ8KDFMUz5uTbQAdzSHdKhUwdG902C0K59RylJ5P0BAYVQqTN la0PaooQy1ZXP3a5b1wImSOx7jBNPdHlY6xjixaB8obZqelrfNGMZhJRh96sLWEY6Q1HiNq6Silr KVghKqfeUAi7kASKSPjVlSJ4VbZURp8XOcgi0baT0hAGLaO7D0w9hK3GIaEMQrr+UrlYyrMmDox0 RFlIIyryI/m9iF34fN2CqgKI67RFTe1jC+zWZ5A2+GUnOivE7HTzEc/ujIZmQ9teh2KhQoJkTrds y9sYOBHpQaGsgrIdRom1UTkyRi0srUhKeoMsQaVqIY5MbFuptiBAtTYhod0OV+gqFnWKli6f45To QneUQHgUJHCsymswulaQPK0yBnFdIAARNSjQ6xFVFBVzgifdir6leEBRJfhe1xOSYqSuvzqbZsxS tnwqxECUVSmGFqqne1JqfmUBT/ne606J/ZWvm8EJGTfW1ppARHCQmIqQjFYJIUmFR2wpRBsscbqh NQxtX41L2f710uhcsCwfwZ/+n350z3GOiyTBxAqVruUWcuLkvBm8gyAyVi5+ElhEAj4TWl1kJd7m lizE0su6gOJj9GnwW8nl184M0csRBkcRAvKRRRblrXZ+5w2K2Y6zUHTglVlRydXqG1ZIVGWjPIJb 5ImrJ24FHsi8czg/6udoUKkariTCEHewg3bekNk7+KEPgTBDP2Vrt70BDaN3Rcj10Ic7qaRWTh6e T09MOjW9tEW7OHOpfVSNLECAxwx9ji6QGHNi6NhTM0LryR0qZAZBYqXUO5xIpQPhr82YhUiCOGB/ xyMn586FQz80SqWHGxdFJGLMEFH0YmJTly4ZarJtcPJpBfURmyLUXQlZtbT+GBMgIunSTLn25S43 0u6gYDAQI7tDHSqdF0oVZdYWWe1ovzMYo0yQNxOx3YUpY7SKkOjFaWOEIR4BiUQIog/kBidQFNMT BfllYZUxCY0L9ckCgyxBCuKtarBDMWcmnHZ3yFhGv1TCxbhurRz+9AJdImpPpDs0BmHgS3vCtmEe l3ymGdIBH2EIf5tBNM1e2MD/uMoqIWEwMUfK2eiHzY4B9SOaKIpDdJa0QmhHLzp5A8QV8QZm14Eo ZuEnUU6+5Y9sQakYymG6hBLBYEOHn2gDMFXcUPOdYQTPlnEdiDDxYKBF5CDEm4kfAKyYopBIwZYF Sq0lUlVJHQTOFcEm20v+xQhIAHFkHDn2R25F4sq6azAYGeo6QUOm5g0mE8B1ErntMjpBAULsFlEE t4RSYu3Yxy51MERmZ4LEB+I4t85GV10IM33iHMXwNf9KdvDjOLrwr5muUV1BQFIJ4DebYVd6GL4P y693x2swldhCHQJRu47JJqHdWuQBZaLaLsOqNzCsuEAQyxmWjgkOoZgd3go6RoK67qsaFBkMTais wRMh4tgCXPuIzsGJK3q370iIrUIlz/sxJPkK7oOCXlo8K9I+enqrrQm/j1CL86K+j2MU2CIMsjMK ynoXKNBAwtiERwiY+4MqQagDsCqVjjnCRCgEQ5CE0bunqFGWvCgMPur+CdmgQiRxCDcyo9lJHeQ4 vjcAwsFIN5zQGnO6gxvSBM/yvk6Bv+VRFtIojEowLUJhJYZIQUmjITkiDzLAN0mor4Z4DLaACMiq iDNyF4nxkyOpkQZERGtiH9kphNGTEkvsrRS7r0eUmS14qS/ZGjJRDD+YQ8LAhEcgi8VAkD4Yvpmo BGX5uIh4CjMwhEo0xUA4QndijCBamFviJ1aciUwohE6cGF1cCO4zi/77km4hg0JwQkPoQouohEZo RszYmHiaGAjJpSSRGMX4Qyd8BIjDCk2QhEdoxj1xQkYohHC8xEssuC9hRidsBGhkF3QsBDcZEQVb CNAwi02MxtTzkSf+lARIqERxTMdpFAS06INHIMgYqYR3sQPA0RsycUJK+MXBkIQm5LtIQoiaKxTE SI1x4rxLlARk5MV1eg1DWiDNcI2qsD52DKd5e0mZBIp7WqCZnIkAUQhUzImuQEgVtMToWEcpaQTW e8nd+BprExfS6bSbpCS3Wg5DqJCaUxPA2xuOMKLf07+sycqtHLLf8yz8OUlBKQOwSggLAx8jOkJB 6Aut1D9AaMusSccwur+/yLb7gztBwByu1ErMgUvZWEvZCCNA8IP7UwSErAPA3MtBIQkjMoRGgKrf 05rQkY1COML848okJA95o6CknAispEw3kDS41JqvQQKou0y/dIP+tbQLZlsRuygERrhFMngIvsjK yeRKrzxMQSSVN8C5mgmNNziv21zLxLxNv/SKDrmD2lGTI4Mbd5osoUiI/hIUC6mUuWkUumBJhtAg ytHOyngIKykyooGIOsDCupugUsEXXsRH6eSpXdIfxqrO2+i3SsMO9fubhnhK+FRGhmhPh5BI0Pgn /OSpOnJPMHkKuItOA+XP9RCNCuOICMofA8086uvPzYil/8SV2UHQ9RSO9gSTe4qKeEmIjAE9e5Mb y9AXO8mi18BCmOs+vZEx0iIaRmA0f+MLqoi88iwVLsEMrnjLsIQb4CtG5hie/ronCuMRqII7gUmE p4xAnUqXQfH+CpK8QR4EIwDJRwDxie46EtXEPX3sOlJ5UV2TjluEQ/SIT7HMRN74sqa6qUuLUv5k jrN0TurMlZWgity6nTvTjiGUuzb4g/LcDFlSwKOQzkHpmMwplohAm734EY9USu8IlkbQDiuRuyXk CKhCqMUUhEa7wUJ8CC37m7f7NE5jo5M0lazZVDR6hLiBUnXjqf1bP5XUPiE5koAh08r4FfSCr8bQ FW87pxFBxtyqjEDIm0YFGuq8r+wZkm4BLsg7F4QCnDHJF1PFkODoib/rzYBZMxZMCJyTpZtQjOpi KreZjU+bOofDiWSpjIfBiX5jGKm41m/7PgUUoYj8oQChOuX+IisgSCymsRAcq9BXfZwROQ5voz13 elNwXUq14ij8JKleM6FJWTHlKDD22DQLGVKdxJwdrYkRgQg7gEhFcBly49A81RuI1IxFJRTFUbf8 oYqXHQqxDCvNYAThuIlRnTBDbRhKa9i+W44MC8NM5A80mLCUytCj2NmOqJSakNHsydmErU4+kVm6 WDRtRSMCMZUnfSnlKZG3iNaR8CokVIzQs1AYfRyS4iHsmYg9YTRCLT8KSlbsUzHIMFTjM9TeWBEk aIThuYmuFRIvwj1Na4iu+hu1Ra8Uk62jZYyGiSDCnZq9MNQ1G5KewcDFqKsOa5hygQmFmaVOCaLc isEQg1j+tEEVvUk1NyXGKmG2F92axzBN6biSp5CYGFwyZw0OUeEWNcEmF72pDJI7d4JavkkdtkCV 5TLJzfWQOnVclpgCTGMLtHiLsJQ4h7G1+VG5ZVVciRgx1n0LqYOIamXTtni5dHkdLRRcZbtW1FCd Qq2JRZHIWCJTxGiDPvAKNBzQ7QhfiQQ/ewOksusupVQWKMDZ6S0njV2L8eEWoZG1xQDFh2jeYoFe gkg4a1mVQFsnLHkgM+gQ+nGmnbIMQ3hKBbnUzNgM1nkb7SmuNVWQ4IFWepU8jtkMkQrVoag0C5Fb NWWEGpQ5TfqPp4hOFTstrR0VBUmWZaVZnUBDAU1g0tX+IY1ROOgjIQgGML5xjRQEkqTIlZx5KHtN q42gKtYCDolAGzugnswT0L0jFPaJ1mKrV/9tWXKR3RCmDLXwTR95tGu5HTbmCTcQqT3hLI5gYY9Z yhHBGqEwhNDiNJJyXR4iU77BHgXZHSQ+ivBVni5mXwvBAehBitAxAzVhSVBOGmvD460oy6+IIFSG gtCJPRMMlfxbUv/ZKzMQkyAWY2pli7SMOzcowarQIBIxg+g6w54TncGVOIy4EjNghEboJbXIGv0b RnPKsJTSC7MAoIhgYZPUzvIjAzeZ5IQbVA3+CkpxVV7p4Gs9DSpJQInYNzYiA0FoBMQJFf04CG9G A03+xo8UbJppeZiSE46lOEu+0ATQ2DMkiAI30IQN6YOwMIQrXQgAOiFDcsJCwARNwFnpWgiiw7Fd 7BjBgATY9ARGkObXeRuwax0H9C7gSjog6QMjpSDV+Nr1qCVAyIRNQIrgOCX6u9JG3bPcgKUvCjMA oaBxYQtNyISRcR2WAKvZ0KPMSASGhqVKqCe+WeYCXhQ/8B+PgIRGo6MISYpiS0pN0IQEngv+qOCN yaXvc9t8W486fGhJQI8jaTCSPIi49sTmoIus2Io7eIQtmJNBURYN6hffpCOxORKPgJ9qCcUi3oJH YA4PdDh7eo2kbKLMga0+8AMZIYN6KuFP0c62Ipj+L5EEzFiJzIBW6dksvsEO8CCJQqBqFSTJ1TnB QDHesgAEZ6GSxzbNdkGbqyADvzUKTGDJNrgDNlmJRFk7GjrFfPYRPzhGbNmElGBXQaiE2hiVeRZT bMEyJAitSmAExSDtaKKZqfCESkAMRfgZWYFqHpSLJuqcU8IIqfIRgyXStzqbl6bttEuxCqE0jHjt hRgPruALpugWV+WMuHZthcDozKlb7M1FSeptRgqVqWiETxUQ8HaIqPjUrnAD8I7wTyODCMlwocAE 6ukXhUm7+YDwBO6DRqg5nJAEw8KyZu6D2uA7VxuKLeiDqKiEPdkCRWhG0o7x3XiDMti3C04cjjj+ mjSi74KozGnRjjYoWeMmg/gmiUHxCJcgKLeozGHkcUbQJVjCCTKAjYKYxjL4rzBSlULY7SiohEfY zQCJ50TAL3lk1Xjlu37ZDZ/kcbWyisesEe0ohBmiBC4hA7LcnD4ggy3Iy2lRi72YRqRgBEv4mrJw 3Z1xcVTJnUaHAjJ4BPBGj7wsg3TUCyrhIQlnDPDWhE24q7+WRku3D6Z4F7QwAygnpk5HCDJwCB9E gjJ/nJ7BjIxhDvrLhAp0p0zYgtrwwaWYIeOmBDOogxzZDc6u0WnfGfF2isDgIE2YMoAMYq1rly3w pD9+hMejxDI/lTrfAvSbtIvIwj+5iRwZGWX+54uBPI0tiBCh2YJ6EoRxDI5HeEyPaLaBX49MqISD EIQnZCUbz4w2wIQtfkITrwnhoFCrqYllzoRHKEfBsLb9aQQUSQQzqIQiq4RKAIQoMB1GqA2/PqVA KMdKIGuHmLUarYQZWubzRpzq9gRlEWZMmJ1AsIQt0AnB4HFafDxFMCWmkCJDqPMCjpSp0cAZ8YTM UDxGwATSPm1XkXFkMXc3QHenCISrKItMIMcI8fVIKUcIagM16GRi71uqz5msZhyX3gvSzkkfLwoT 5ySwQggTl5q7vgN2n5Cl0D+G7bRxlARJwASMPiXlsAT4kQRLoEGp6Be4ZQyPSATcxoRFdcL+g1gb +BGEm1YLjQOj6Jgp1EEIS3g8T78I0r8VjUBet6gdReCwEyqEZG8MGQG5tegbRqgMOJ+Q4TYIbBGx PoD27rAez1r6QDAiY2FJNhEaSNgESHdvEO8+wymI716IqSY6nkeIYCruNtCETEGCR6iEAfFwqLeM D2cTSwiS3cl22vGEzYEsoakEqUALq+kIOMIbOAIIMoWQQEFiRxAUHHLu3ClYsNIbMp4wtUECqU8f SZ4AmXnISJCiMp62EEQiqVBBPyM7mkSJ5I0kQw37VHJTx00fRoBKOizpSVLJNjLfCCq0BcqdTC4Z earEkGQgTz2nmnHDNFDUQDyRYBJ0043+oT4Ft3i60xETyYKFJEHxw0iSmzduAhV68/BRwT6eDL3Z kshhXIwvPblsY8aTWCSG2Fbs+cZOwaguoVSaHJPlyT5IJFoFW8hNQU+gkdx500Z0QTeokQC6UwdJ IakEFxfsqBrKmzueEBIUVBa3bCiq3Rh+1AjKFkyW7hBkZGnqVuJAH3rqmPjOyYJvAAGq7pARyTKY UN6x6akk7ZIqKW4myNAuDiBI8BLMqJlpmzaM7mQ8PxCKJIxA0UglnjSGBCUDvRFbQRUlSBBlhWhW SCXCyQUFS9BB8VNPGGH0RkZmZIfEFgV6oogbcQVXUh+lFWQIao94UgZPZW2VGiOVIBH+iIAlrSWW JJBAMZVdiWRSkCKVsIVRiqPt9MYbhBXUkJSwsWXGVnaI1YdqLrkRk0MBhmnITqopAgUjW3liF4SJ oAbamrhBQcYjgOjlI2MERYlEH7FNplogwgUXpRuAxPWIIjRVohkUhkA05I0N+aGJJJJUgoknjFzI HJhQAncgToy0EZNYUAa31lSKeNJUWvxBFp8fpOVV4WZNVUKGZgVCwSUUloQ1nydkuMFfZlDERgYS r43Y63GKIVbSFozeiASHPPVBhiKZ/IXgf3wysomUtxEUF3OQGotacpakRa0h5mKJ1GFkPOjQYjsp 11NH5UGhSYuFuLmFJGeyyCcUdWT+SjC1vBVCybs8MXRmlOQBaFmaBVWq3V5bItFGaKMVRG0gjIqm WR9ocXkqW2yqtlNsGGEcaJSAxfnWkQg6pRYlREHHaCVp2YWpsC8BiGhiw42FSaAmNWvHnmqxtVUb lnhCCZ8zIYFDHkCkBkUi071RYJpiYUpQIGZUUrGfJWFCCXO6oeSGSe0SZImmIHryiI8NTbvhdCXd EYgkmLA5YqJ9KIJJymXlpiFscSJxWLNQQKIJS1sgVK6SmbCpVoWB+CbtfrzlKAlGmjxS8bhIlaSJ Jls0JBGyxupIZNJvGDxQQ2DOPZklXmqCiWZ3tFGu4w55ksjGXRKkSduqoSeJ3sD+iXXYo3xm0pC4 wNklI1Y51UQQqrzllZgZqIPmJkpQ3oFJ5IONJkglfljcrKn0Pp2XQzJCUXtCaSBRElYqxJzTIEsz mCIJRpYlNa2UjBHCitpGzGAGTDjwJZXAy5AKlCBG0IdxTenJHSghCKaYQUuUqJOjOlKIQrRLJYFQ xFGmFRuPtYwgp9EWhZA1Gr38ZXOO4tMWMpEpCiFEToe5CBISoQn5EYQlHHPPTwhSp5K8BYSm6Ylv PmOxyVSmJJVwioBUpZRE0GpD5YLiTjDkCa3sC29mgARiSFII5lUsezJCyBYsUQbQxGxcqGHKRQTx iEzwJj0OiR6CylWRiniidYL+AMSo5FYQgzHKN4GIliUuYqFTlVExtatJY0AzBfn4iIyFiJ0i6rMW SzzyMwFrzBYmlwkeCSJ2W2AE6wzxETK0oWuPOCWJmKIJRRyIKl2rFCUqJYkXlmgiZVDEMNGUCEE0 4hEXKpDAphKFNzwiYJvrpiKQtb6mYOmJBcEES0DjBkUss4mUmEi33OAHmpSEDH17orSmlIlKQIKN rOnmHchghsZkyA0EeoQgooAdUSHBDZZoBMfMcAdNZGKgsNGEJ5AYBUEEqDF34GghStMHSiiiPH3A aEgzITDx8Gtj8IveHINUETdgi3RREIgkBDE8OGpCEIHYBELa0E2daqcnXWP+KHEUikwBSuIRbogC FNrATmIi5516bAQ628JR7HVTfmpJxAofITyemEEJpBROYwRxI9M01EVxSRXjHBOIsJilDGUwg6FM E5dCDXSgKYprE9tgF+ssblylCdTHAKsh4gjPDHYdqO38IFjiGMYwc4no46iSmje0q5gN3drGppWh JvbEYw3rSRqj45CGgQaRrzFnUHiSNGuVa7Sjjept//Aa0GrobzMRRFg8VpKBAvZCDW2XWRi3uf9h iEY9ga1i87mx+DAXecJRXU8CVZVtNaQxIJLV3lgjsN36DTrC1U4dBipY/mDEUIIQxEcDAYiQ4uRd XAuvhswAIsEA9rxbkQv+RtabE0PIVxALeoN8GZJG0CRGODfybIb4a8Mb/ZXCvLWLdO2yXAx1aEca Msx1M/vfDespRSTuUB/agJCcJKLCcsKv7dowF+ZoxrMOkS5upwI3xdpww26gLp80A5n6+A3EIFpt a5/b252I5YwddgyPb+weLUEMkQ7xg5W3UhrDdCTKQsOvsT7rHpcR2ViAEXHSbLwxfI0POllu7VqL qros7wq7Y3UIG9U8Jd7ctiF01pMdXONfegWPv3ewQ6IUy9Az2uXFU2FiTyRZEvL2N8t2AHIR86k3 QSTGLgtWDJHwJWMpD9rJf9bQ5sCKFORqqA8kNkwdTo1foSk2EDvUqcP+8uJkizZ4x/91yCJLDZ3N IZJNdSgqjt3jHis3WMyMIzOUT6wnx3hqK8hDCE6WXRAtOZkggCjpqGO7q2ml9sZWlvZUxGct6v41 y31YMa0ZNRTolAm6BMlmnJUd5R3zB8MGadC0ciNw4Xk5ro3Gb0cUAaWD54W0fCpJXIbsaJ54DG6D njZP5HTI8u6Yj4B9jXXL6zD8tqsqh4wqfs87JLkcKDeBemuy8+MG+GLEwDq+spvjbOWLl/bEd8AB DkhT7Q5tZ6DRgxLexFLunHS7J5OxcOpmLSdP4ZYlejNnaTgrIHNJfdboLgkgtEL1krApQ2e8w7a2 3Vuw89y//q3Lbi3+PnHGIe+J/Al4XP3pKeZ8Xc+bRciCcDN0CtO4Ee/l+sTPffMvPzflRaTwF9CA htcwXFajkSRRVjxYXet7WvuJ6471zBO+MHyAqTNDi1w9pHHLuuCMn5aMAY9grjf6tB77lZy3wqg+ eT3Ue0vxaMbOuOFBpiOit7d2JI6kIcka+RmPOCSIghLzOtZHGu5DIhrrhkS4GiN1eY/OoBx1YONX 3VTBARokyLHVViR674bSa/RWB80EYsN/tlPKQxxXvnAdxGARHqNsmF34muuh2mJxhHZQXfQ8kb2p EMbRmVx8F2A1W+5Bh2Goz9dhCMRh196oWZNNRdJQ4K/NWkNsRxsbAILN+Y2VTR94AcZURM/qWUtp +R6qVd5zBQQAADs= ------=_NextPart_000_0000_01C7F497.C12895D0 Content-Type: image/gif Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: http://meria.idc.ac.il/images/journal.gif R0lGODlhwwA2APcAAAAAAFJSUoQAAIQICIwQEIwhIZQpKZwxMZxCQqVKSq1SUq1jY62trbVra71z c72EhMaMjM6UlM6lpdatrd61td7GxufOzu/W1u/n5/fv7/////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////////////////////////////////////////////////////yH5BAEAABoALAAAAADDADYA AAj+ADUIHEiwoMGDCBMqXMiwocOHECNKnEixosWLGDNq3Mixo8ePIEMuxFDhgsiTKFOqVGhhAQEB DyRieECzps2bNFfq3PnxwoMCAoLClOjTQYKXQpMKKOAgJ8+nUGVKOKA0aMyKGBRUFRAhqtevDi1s tYoRaNIFYNOqPQjBpIYESa9ahJsUwtq7eAVKiIvxgdIKeQOnpcD3ot+kgAUrhlqhsMXDQhMvnryS sFC5FSEHlUy5s8jGl/v+9Uw6pGWyhkeXXs0RNOrHqlnLvnh6aGrERCtQ4KyWAgaDu3+PrCC8oG7i EzFAQICUAIIHbh26tg0bd1iXSg04KH7QJ06nBb/+g0d4wcFLuRgaNMdcsOVmgu6TFpDwEMOCsUEb cFdYm/1EzQLwhpB9QRlA0wJm5bffQDMhWNVBDyCQoFAJTVWYBRMGRUFBM024oQbp4effQRUgJYCB EWa3IImOZRZbQhguZUFBEphowIwKaZWUQhEoZVBLJoYWY1UIDEQBXaNhYAB+Qa1I0F5CKUCQkkk1 0NB0I0YEoIDtAUXAihaYSACOCfmokJkEQZDAA0vGhcFLC7QpVJECJbDAA1QhFmMBD+wmQYZ2JXRB ggUY9GZSThLUn2jWITTkhweJJdSXCiGwY6WXIpSnVQeMKdADJkJK0IQSGDCfQUgKQCdC9wnlwEH+ DtTFEJaMRpYQlScu1GpQB2BKoa9BKQRBUlSRCeICB3CpgWYDGLDiBWgeFKSxA0336kKL3mYrQpAF KqhSohZk6a8JjRtsQtNR55BmziY04ZlCFXoQBkmtim6LFG1JXlLUHrTpUuVmipC5AvAnn0SaKVtn owYlmKUG9TKUbXXbGrRrwQwNy+/AAh9EsEK0aplUuOGNDCNQCcAblL0IhUzxe9IKZUBDkobmcccG fZzQxA8lrJDPFGEA5coS4/vfi0ZG3FCQLA+kc8DksmgzREBzy/BDFWCnNMhGI4z0p1svRDABHEd9 s9nGdb2QZiQTxDZEQptVgMZEY6s21V+/Fbb+QqlinDPO4gKe9NQ9X11yxSOBGlQCOO4t9WsuGq4B wU1bLfjTZZ/b8t0JVQ2h5BwqLsAC0UE8Z9GE55v32OtGSxDmZ2t+EM+tC9X2QG/zhxTpBjlukMuR I+60650nNXPsfmee/O+cWw6z8wHmGFQB/Qrke0G0H72xQbFuv3ZSKSMvtuACAV/7858LT1ADQiV6 PUHma4+2XkrRx5Bm3gY+/+vka5D9/SYrnu0cdboyFdBgqZOfAMjWHaWEbyGpchLs/ra/8jUvfegz iOcIsit5IeR91bogAA9oEDk1iSHm6pXyxldB/4nwcBmEYfQO8i4D1g2BkBsJBKAjw/zRqH7+DPGe xRClEBNyLYEj1NDPAtg7In6QhJtDYqTMQincOREhJvQgQk7zQAwKwH4H0VEL45fEGUJPWeAaEAgF 8r+DXEyFYAsKWliilIdpoFVV3CKx5tWpCSmsNtfCm/rcBrogHQ97QWKgBibQNjIiTwBkwmOiBjK0 oFRPA5IiQOnmpZSuPIkAmiTYA/czncrpioleBGNB+iYlBsHFhAL4TY+qV5s5MuRiAnigWVQpvUn1 K0wL3CSrstMUB2lyckopgIQ8ORBcTpKGSQnkQVJlyx8msyltUgC9kkIAoLRyiPF6pkBqJhT66IiX C6nk6HBkgcMUQJgDCpJSjolMbi6AWj3kys4lD5JPXyJkAlVhZkFgyU37EfSbU2Jfdm5XEIBuhXoS scC/qqIfiAzJgcUxlwEkwB0JMAc/ztmnR+UZLwTYDwEf3YpzeImr7ESHbkFBqEAaQLCxEMBKMNIa ARKATos6wFw7hYA458Wm6S2AN5a6Z3eOs5sKONWpu/GNoJj6VKjqRjhRPU5VjwNPC00PnYpjXKSo WtWsUgCes9lIBlay1rS69a1wjatc50pXygDgrnjNq173yte++vWvgA2sYAdL2MIa9rCITaxiF8vY xjr2sZCNrGQnS9nKWraxdc2sZjdL14AAADs= ------=_NextPart_000_0000_01C7F497.C12895D0--